[Japan’s Voices No.11] Japan’s 2026 Intelligence Reform: Structure, Background, and Prospects | Research Findings

On May 27, 2026, the Japanese Diet passed legislation establishing the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and its secretariat, the National Intelligence Secretariat (NIS)*. This reform is widely regarded as one of the most important efforts to strengthen Japan’s intelligence capabilities since the end of World War II. This assessment reflects the fact that, together with the 2008 intelligence community reforms and the 2013 state secrets protection law discussed in the following section, the 2026 legislation ranks among the few major postwar overhauls of Japan’s intelligence system. This article examines the historical background of Japan’s intelligence system and then the significance and prospects of the recent reform.

Characteristics and Historical Development of Japan’s Intelligence Functions1

Postwar Japan’s intelligence community consists of five core organizations: the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the National Police Agency, and the Public Security Intelligence Agency. In functional terms, these five organizations together cover foreign, defense, domestic security, and law-enforcement-related intelligence. CIRO serves as the principal coordinating body. Because CIRO belongs to the Cabinet Secretariat and effectively operates under the Prime Minister’s Office, Japan’s intelligence community shares certain structural similarities with the US intelligence community organized under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), although the authority and scale of Japan’s system remain far more limited.

Japan’s intelligence community differs from its counterparts in other G7 nations and Australia in several notable ways. First, the scope of its intelligence activities is relatively narrow and institutional authority remains limited. In particular, Japan lacks both an independent foreign human intelligence (HUMINT) organization and a dedicated domestic intelligence service. Second, integration within the intelligence community has historically been weak. The Director of Cabinet Intelligence (DCI), who heads CIRO and is broadly comparable in coordinating functions to the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), possesses limited legal authority over other agencies. Third, democratic oversight mechanisms remain underdeveloped. For example, Japan’s Diet has no standing committee dedicated specifically to intelligence oversight.

This situation can largely be attributed to two historical factors. First, postwar Japan retained a deep institutional aversion to strong intelligence organizations because of memories of wartime repression and the suppression of civil liberties. Second, for many decades after World War II, Japanese political leaders relied heavily on the United States for major security decisions and strategic intelligence, reducing the perceived need to develop independent intelligence capabilities.

Nevertheless, the Japanese government has gradually attempted to strengthen its intelligence functions. Various reforms have been implemented since the mid-2000s. For example, in 2008 the government adopted an extensive intelligence community reform program and subsequently implemented many of its provisions. It also enacted a new state secrets protection law in 2013. Against this broader historical backdrop, the passage of the 2026 legislation constitutes a major step in the evolution of postwar Japanese intelligence institutions.

Significance of the Enactment of the New Law

The newly-enacted legislation is expected to produce several important institutional changes.
First, CIRO and its head the DCI will be reorganized into the National Intelligence Secretariat (NIS) and the Director of the National Intelligence Secretariat (DNIS)*. Second, the coordination authority exercised by the DNIS within the intelligence community will be strengthened through a clearer statutory foundation. Third, the institutional mechanism connecting policymakers and the intelligence community will be significantly enhanced. Specifically, the existing Cabinet Intelligence Council — a vice-ministerial-level body chaired by the Chief Cabinet Secretary — will be elevated to the ministerial-level National Intelligence Council (NIC) chaired by the Prime Minister (it should be noted that Japan’s NIC differs substantially from the US organization bearing the same name and is functionally closer to the US National Intelligence Priorities Framework, a mechanism for setting national intelligence requirement priorities).

Under this new framework, integration within the intelligence community and the assignment of intelligence requirements by policymakers are expected to improve. This may in turn strengthen the overall intelligence cycle within the Japanese government. Most importantly, the reform directly addresses one of the longstanding structural weaknesses of Japan’s intelligence system: fragmented coordination among intelligence organizations.

As a result, the NIS may be better positioned to enhance all-source intelligence analysis2 and coordinate community-wide intelligence policies and operations. Such efforts could include the expansion of common personnel training, improvements in information-sharing systems, and stronger interagency coordination. In terms of coordination structure, Japan’s intelligence governance system may move somewhat closer to the ODNI-centered model of the United States, although major institutional differences will remain. 

Understanding what enabled such extensive reforms requires examining several converging factors.

Background Factors Enabling the Reform

Several factors appear to have enabled this significant intelligence reform.

The first is the changing security environment surrounding Japan. In East Asia, this includes China’s ongoing rise and North Korea’s continued development of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. More broadly, recent conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran have highlighted structural instability in the international political environment, producing wider economic and societal effects that are also felt in Japan. These developments may have contributed to a growing perception in Japan that the country can no longer rely primarily on allied intelligence for early warning and crisis management.

The second factor is gradual changes in Japanese public opinion. Alongside shifts in the security environment, Japanese society appears to be increasingly receptive to stronger national security capabilities while remaining attentive to the risks of potential overreach. This trend is reflected in recent public opinion polling. During Diet deliberations on the aforementioned legislation, the bill notably received support not only from the governing coalition but also from some opposition lawmakers, albeit often with reservations and conditions attached.

The third factor is political momentum. Following the formation of a new administration in late 2025, the coalition agreement between the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Innovation Party included provisions calling for stronger intelligence capabilities. In addition, media reports indicate that the United States — Japan’s most important ally — is in favor of Japanese efforts to upgrade intelligence coordination and capabilities.

Future Prospects

In the course of Diet deliberations on this legislation, the Prime Minister and other senior government officials repeatedly identified two areas as priority challenges requiring continued attention.

One is stepping up foreign intelligence capabilities, principally overseas HUMINT collection. Achieving this objective would require not only new organizational arrangements and legal authorities but also the recruitment, training, and long-term retention of specialized personnel.

The other is enhancing counterintelligence capabilities3. Current discussions include proposals to increase penalties for espionage activities conducted on behalf of foreign powers and to introduce a legal framework resembling the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Such measures are intended to improve transparency within Japan’s democratic political process amid growing concerns regarding foreign influence operations and information warfare.

These initiatives directly address several longstanding weaknesses within Japan’s intelligence system. At the same time, however, it remains uncertain whether such additional reforms will ultimately be realized. These two directions—foreign HUMINT and counterintelligence—raise especially acute questions about civil liberties and democratic oversight.

As noted above, Japanese public opinion has gradually become more accepting of greater national security capabilities, but substantial concerns remain regarding possible human rights violations and the politicization of intelligence activities. These concerns were explicitly acknowledged in a supplementary resolution attached to the legislation recently passed by the Diet. Future efforts to bolster foreign intelligence and counterintelligence functions could affect civil liberties more directly than the establishment of the NIC and NIS themselves and may therefore provoke stronger public debate.

Consequently, one of the central issues moving forward will be whether more robust intelligence activities can obtain sufficient democratic legitimacy and public trust. To achieve this, transparency, accountability mechanisms, and effective oversight institutions will become increasingly important. Possible measures could include more stringent parliamentary oversight through a dedicated committee system, regular reporting mechanisms, and highly independent administrative oversight institutions.

While Japan may in due course draw lessons from countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the central challenge will be whether Japanese political leadership and society can establish an intelligence governance system suited to Japan’s own political, social, and historical context.

Conclusion

As discussed above, the current reforms are likely to strengthen Japan’s intelligence cycle and improve coordination within the intelligence community to a meaningful degree. Whether further reforms — particularly in the areas of foreign HUMINT and counterintelligence — will follow remains uncertain. Japan’s intelligence reform of 2026 represents an important structural advance. Yet its long-term success will depend not only on institutional design but also on the democratic legitimacy necessary to embed these reforms within a durable culture of accountability appropriate to Japan’s own historical and political circumstances. Ultimately, their success hinges on political leadership and the active commitment of the public to sustaining that legitimacy and accountability.