Do you recall who the Japanese prime minister was three years ago? Not the late Shinzo Abe, he stepped down in 2020. Never mind. Even Japanese friends sometimes struggle to recall who was in office a couple of years back. A common quip in summit halls is that foreign leaders don’t bother to learn the pronunciation of Japanese prime ministers’ names, as there will be another one in the next meeting. The average tenure typically lasts around two years. Abe’s nearly eight-year term was an outlier. The long tenure helped to develop many important policies (such as Abenomics and the 2015 Security Legislation) and to take root with some success. He also successfully managed to thwart the wrath of U.S. President Donald Trump during his first term. With Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s resignation after less than one year, Japan looks set to revisit the age of revolving-door premiers.
In Japan, leaders rotate; institutions endure. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) remains a rare case in Western-style democracies with a near-continuous grip on power since 1955 (with two short-term interruptions). However, after bruising electoral setbacks and falling approval ratings, Ishiba resigned, forcing an emergency party leadership contest that will all but determine the next prime minister.
What most damaged the LDP’s credibility was the 2023-24 political funds (slush fund) scandal, which triggered the dissolution of several major factions within the party. LDP factions – which are very institutional and remarkable for their stability – bankroll lawmakers’ daily political operations, cultivate networks, and help them meet constituents’ needs. Without the faction’s support, it would be hard for members to survive politically. Because the LDP dominates Parliament, factional bargaining has long shaped leadership outcomes. The scandal revealed failures to report hundreds of millions of yen, funneled into illegal slush funds. Beginning in Fumio Kishida’s era, the affair eroded support and contributed to Ishiba’s Upper House setback. With the factions disbanded and opposition divided, Japanese politics has grown more fluid and less predictable.
Economic headwinds compounded Ishiba’s fall. Japan’s cost of living outpaces salaries, with core inflation around 3.1% (July 2025). One of the loudest public complaints has been the surge in rice prices, a staple, which has risen to around 4,000 yen ($27) for a 5-kilogram bag, a trend many blame on past agricultural policy choices as real wages struggled to keep pace.
The next LDP leader inherits deeper structural problems. Since the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accident, Japan has remained heavily import-dependent for energy, leaving families and industry exposed to global fuel swings and shocks. Demographics are slow-burning shocks of their own: Births hit a modern low in 2024, the population is aging rapidly, and people 65 or older account for nearly 30% of the country. That means rising social-security costs, which already account for about a third of the budget, and heavier debt-service burdens in a country (occupying almost one quarter of the budget) with one of the world’s highest debt-to-GDP ratios (234.9% of the GDP). Add the security environment: a more assertive China, an unpredictable North Korea. These complex problems must be tackled against the backdrop of the emergence of an increasingly unreliable U.S. ally, as well as the impact of pounding tariff shocks and the complication of supply-chain and export strategies for Japanese firms.
Candidates to lead Japan
The new prime minister must face these complex and daunting structural challenges. So, who wants the job? So far, five contenders have stepped forward.
Toshimitsu Motegi (69): A seasoned power broker, known as pragmatic, pro-business centrist. He is open to wider coalition arithmetic after the election setbacks, an asset for a minority ruling block. He served as LDP secretary-general between 2021 and 2024 and no longer holding this position is a handicap.
Yoshimasa Hayashi (64): Currently the chief Cabinet secretary. He is Harvard-educated with a diplomatic and technocratic profile. He is seen as a moderate who emphasizes broad-based wage growth and respect for central bank independence.
Sanae Takaichi (64): A conservative stalwart who enjoyed Abe’s support in the last election. She is fiscally dovish, or, to put it another way, spending-friendly, but firmly hawkish on security issues, following Abe’s line. If chosen, she would be Japan’s first female prime minister.
Shinjiro Koizumi (44): Media-savvy reformist with a social-policy streak, notably taking paternity leave as a cabinet minister, who forms a pragmatic and image-forward brand. He is a second-generation lawmaker, the son of “maverick” Junichiro Koizumi, who governed approximately two decades ago and revived the fortunes of the LDP. He is the youngest contender.
Takayuki Kobayashi (50): Former Finance Ministry official and the country’s first minister for economic security. A security-focused conservative with U.S. policy experience, running as a change candidate.
The party president is chosen in a two-round vote by LDP Diet members and rank-and-file (prefectural) members. Suppose no candidate clears 50% in the first round. In that case, a runoff is held, in which prefectural votes are reduced by one-third, thereby diminishing grassroots influence and tilting the outcome toward parliamentary caucus deal-making. History suggests that after periods of LDP weakness and electoral pain, the party produces strong leaders with relatively long tenures who reset its fortunes. Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) and Shinzo Abe (2012-2020) both emerged after downturns in LDP support. Whether that pattern can repeat in a post-faction landscape, and with reconfigured opposition, remains an open question.
The new leader will have constraints. Grand experiments may be necessary, but they will face domestic headwinds. Continuity should be expected in U.S. alliance and economic-security policy, although the tempo and tone may differ. Near-term questions are how quickly to normalize monetary settings and how openly to signal deterrence toward China and North Korea.
Despite its aging population and debt, Japan remains an economic heavyweight, a technological leader, an active player in global governance and a potential great power in the military sphere. For the Asia-Pacific, leadership stability in Tokyo is crucial because it sustains defense modernization in the region, deepens supply-chain resilience with partners, and maintains active engagement with Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific agenda.
For Türkiye, the implications are practical. As Japanese firms diversify their production networks, opportunities arise for investment, co-production, and logistics that bridge Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Japan-Türkiye relations are long-standing, institutional and resilient. Energy security, disaster-resilience and advanced manufacturing are areas where Japan’s ambitions align with Türkiye’s ambitions. Defense industry cooperation is another. Earlier concerns about Ankara’s frictions with Western partners have eased alongside Türkiye’s more conciliatory tone since 2022, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and broader disruptions in the Western alliance created by the Trump administration’s trade policies. In an era of hedging, Tokyo and Ankara have reasons to collaborate and the space to do so.
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