Japan is on the verge of a political reset, and markets are already trying to price the consequences. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has taken an early and unusually aggressive gamble by calling a snap election barely three months into her tenure. The move is high risk, but the motivation is clear: secure a clean public mandate before her political capital decays, and convert early popularity into durable policy power.
The timing matters. Takaichi inherited a wounded party and a minority government after a bruising election cycle, funding scandals, and a cost-of-living backlash that hollowed out public trust. Yet her approval ratings have held near 70%, an anomaly in modern Japanese politics. The snap election is designed to lock that goodwill in now, before inflation fatigue or market volatility can erode it. A decisive victory would free her from constant coalition bargaining and allow policy to move from negotiation to execution.
Polling suggests that gamble is likely to pay off. The Liberal Democratic Party is expected to reclaim a clear lower-house majority and could even approach supermajority territory. That outcome would significantly strengthen the government’s hand, including the ability to pass legislation without relying heavily on upper-house cooperation. For markets, that signals continuity, not chaos, and a more predictable policy runway.
Reading the tea leaves objectively, and judging by how smoothly yesterday’s sale cleared, fiscal fears may be overstated, and it increasingly looks like the big Tokyo lifers are at least considering stepping back into the market, even as investors remain wary that a strong Takaichi mandate could unleash unfunded tax cuts, particularly around food consumption taxes; yet her campaign tone has been deliberately cautious, with food inflation politically toxic and energy subsidies already reinstated, she has avoided locking in hard promises on tax cuts and instead leaned on the language of “responsible and proactive public finances,” a signal markets would be unwise to dismiss.
Japan has been here before. Under Abe, the LDP raised consumption taxes even while running stimulus, choosing fiscal sequencing over fiscal recklessness. Takaichi appears to be walking the same line. While she supports near-term relief for households, the party has reiterated its commitment to debt sustainability and to longer-term reform. Any tax cuts are likely to be time-limited, politically framed, and offset elsewhere rather than left to balloon unchecked.
The Bank of Japan adds another layer of stabilization. As the Bank of Japan slowly unwinds its ETF and J-REIT holdings, it is quietly creating a non-distortionary funding buffer. The scale may look small month to month, but structurally, it matters. After a decade-long equity rally, asset sales can generate meaningful returns without fresh issuance or overt fiscal stress. This does not solve Japan’s debt problem, but it buys time and reduces tail risk.
Where the real structural shift lies is not fiscal drama, but economic normalization. Japan is finally exiting its deflationary long winter. expectations are stabilizing near 2%, wage growth is consistently running above 4–5%, and labour shortages are embedding pricing power back into the economy. This is not a temporary spike; it is a regime change. In that context, higher JGB yields are not a policy failure but a feature of recovery.
As the BoJ reduces its market footprint and continues gradual policy normalization, bond markets will become more volatile, more price-sensitive, and more honest. That means a steeper curve, weaker central bank suppression, and yields that reflect growth rather than stagnation.
FX is where the tension sharpens. A strong LDP win reinforces the so-called “Takaichi trade”: firmer growth expectations, looser near-term fiscal bias, and upward pressure on yields. All else equal, that is yen-negative. drifting back toward the 160 zone overshoot would not be surprising, especially with speculative positioning far less stretched than in 2024.
But those levels are politically toxic. While a weaker yen helps exporters, it directly feeds import inflation at a moment when the government is trying to ease household pressure. That sets up a familiar pattern: rallies toward the upper 150s invite official resistance and speculative pushback. However, we know that Intervention may not produce a lasting reversal without a fundamental shift in U.S. rates, but it can cap momentum, even at the expense of increased volatility
The takeaway is subtle but important. A major LDP victory does not signal fiscal abandonment or bond-market panic. It signals policy continuity, economic normalization, and a government more willing to tolerate higher yields as a reflection of growth rather than something to suppress at all costs. For FX, it means upside pressure on USD/JPY paired with an increasingly active Tokyo verbal intervention presence. For rates, it means the long road back to something Japan has not had in decades: a bond market that actually trades.
AloJapan.com