Korea’s national strength and making a Korea–Japan partnership

 
Kim Dong-ho
 
The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo. 
 
 
 
In Mapo District in western Seoul stand two institutions that symbolize the twin pillars of Korea’s modern history: industrialization and democratization. The Park Chung Hee Memorial Hall and the Kim Dae-jung Library occupy the same neighborhood, a physical proximity that recently led their representatives to convene a joint academic conference. The theme was “Korea–Japan relations opened by Park Chung Hee and broadened by Kim Dae-jung,” with discussion focused on the partnership’s future. Scholars who study the president identified with industrialization and the president who led democratization rarely gather in the same room. Yet seen through the continuity of modern Korean history, the pairing is hardly strange. Industrialization and democratization are not competing values but two pillars that shaped today’s Korea. The observation by historian E.H. Carr that history is an unending dialogue between past and present fits neatly here.
 

President Kim Dae-jung (front row, left) and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo sign the “Joint Declaration on a Korea–Japan Partnership for the 21st Century,” which included 11 provisions addressing historic issues, on Oct. 8, 1998. [THE KIM DAE-JUNG LIBRARY]

 
This year marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan. Within that history, the 1998 Kim Dae-jung–Obuchi Declaration stands out as a turning point that redirected bilateral ties toward the future. Many emphasize Kim’s political courage in making that decision. Less often noted is the economic backdrop that gave that decision force. Kim’s diplomatic vision could be realized because it rested on the fruits of industrialization driven by Park Chung Hee. The Miracle on the Han River was not merely a shift in economic indicators. It was a structural transformation that compelled Japan to reassess Korea. Without the manufacturing competitiveness and national stature accumulated through industrialization, Japan would have had little reason to treat Korea as an equal partner. In that sense, the expansion of national power underpinned by industrialization was the fundamental engine of the Kim–Obuchi Declaration.
 
Yet the partnership envisioned by that declaration never moved far beyond symbolism. Even Korea’s relationship with China, which normalized ties later, progressed to a free trade agreement and was elevated to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” By contrast, Korea–Japan relations have not been upgraded even once in the 27 years since 1998. Instead, disputes over historic issues such as wartime sexual slavery and forced labor have repeatedly dragged relations back to square one, like Sisyphus pushing his boulder uphill only to see it roll down again. Japan’s export restrictions imposed in 2019 illustrated how quickly bilateral ties can slide into emotional confrontation.
 
 
Korea and Japan are neighbors who cannot move away from one another. That reality argues for coexistence and mutual benefit. The reshaping of global trade triggered by strategic competition between the United States and China further heightens the need for close coordination. Washington has grown more explicit in its transactional approach to diplomacy, treating even allies through a realist lens. Multilateral cooperation has therefore become more important. In this environment, Korea has little reason to continue hesitating over joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade framework led by Japan.
 
The prerequisite for such cooperation is sustained strengthening of Korea’s economic power. With growth rates already slipping toward the 1 percent range, it is not excessive to suggest Korea may be approaching the threshold of a “lost 30 years” similar to Japan’s experience. The speed and impact of low fertility and rapid aging are even more severe in Korea. Korea’s economic size remains about 43 percent of Japan’s. If that gap widens further, Japan could easily revert to viewing Korea as a lesser partner. Even amid relatively stable bilateral ties, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has not softened her hard-line remarks regarding Dokdo, a reflection of Japan’s rightward drift and its reluctance to fully confront its past. As Korea’s national strength weakens, such voices are likely to grow louder.
 
Can Korea continue to build national strength going forward? The outlook is not encouraging. Major economies are mobilizing state capacity to bolster corporate competitiveness. The United States is using tariffs to protect domestic firms. Japan is pursuing economic reconstruction with consistency. China upgrades its state-driven industrial system every five years to sharpen competitiveness. Korea, by contrast, often tightens regulations around its companies. To make matters worse, core economic policies on corporate taxes, nuclear energy and labor markets swing sharply with each change of administration.
 

President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi shake hands ahead of a bilateral summit on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ meeting in Gyeongju on Oct. 30. [YONHAP]

 
This is an era of proxy competition, in which companies fight on behalf of the state. When firms win, national power rises. When national power grows, diplomacy gains leverage. When firms fall behind, the country’s overall strength erodes and its diplomatic options narrow. The future of the Korea–Japan partnership, then, is viable only when Korea is strong. Just as Park laid the foundation through industrialization and Kim expanded the diplomatic horizon, any sustainable partnership with Japan must begin with the accumulation of Korea’s national power.
 
Despite the symbolic weight of the 60th anniversary of normalization, a “Partnership 2.0” has yet to be declared. Much of that reflects Japan’s limited enthusiasm. Even if a belated “Lee Jae Myung–Takaichi Declaration” were to emerge from a bilateral summit planned for January next year, what would matter is not the declaration itself but its substance. There is no shortage of areas for cooperation, from the economy to security. The starting point for all of them is the same: strengthening Korea’s national power.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.