Japan’s historic moment with Sanae Takaichi has quickly given way to political turbulence. Her rise as the country’s first female leader of the Liberal Democratic Party was hailed as a breakthrough for representation in a nation ranked near the bottom of the global gender equality index.
Yet, the optimism surrounding her victory and assumed pathway to the prime ministership has been short-lived. The sudden breakup of the long-standing coalition between the LDP and its junior partner, Komeito has left Takaichi without a majority and facing the most fragile parliamentary arithmetic Japan has seen in decades. Opposition parties are testing the numbers in a bid to take control.
Takaichi, 64, won the LDP leadership in a runoff against Agriculture Minister Shinjiro Koizumi earlier this month. A protégé of the late Shinzo Abe, Takaichi presents herself as a resolute conservative in the mould of Margaret Thatcher – she has even worn the same clothing and jewellery as the Iron Lady – promising to “work, work, work” to revive Japan. She faces an unenviable trifecta: a divided parliament, an economy struggling under the weight of inflation and demographic decline, and foreign partners growing harder to manage.
Komeito’s departure from the LDP-led coalition marks the end of a partnership that has anchored Japanese politics since 1999. The two parties had always seemed strange bedfellows, especially given Komeito’s pacifist leanings as the political arm of Soka Gakkai, an influential lay Buddhist organisation. But it was apparently Takaichi’s refusal to tighten political funding rules and her appointment of Koichi Hagiuda as LDP secretary general – after his aide was convicted and fined in August for failing to report 20 million yen in income – that broke the alliance.
The rift leaves the LDP without a working majority in either house of the Diet, forcing Takaichi to seek new allies among smaller and more ideologically volatile parties.
Takaichi’s rise was historic, but history alone would not sustain her in government.
The most likely partner, Osaka-based Nippon Ishin, aligns with Takaichi on security issues and fiscal conservatism but diverges sharply on immigration and regional autonomy. Any alliance would come at a steep political price. Ishin’s push for stricter immigration controls sits uneasily with the economic reality that Japan’s aging workforce increasingly depends on foreign labour. At the same time, Sanseito, an ascendant right-wing populist party, has been siphoning off young, disillusioned voters by blending nationalist rhetoric with economic protectionism.
Takaichi must confront an economy in slow-motion crisis. Inflation, fuelled by a weak yen, continues to outpace wage growth, hitting households hard. The so-called “Curry Rice Price Index” is up more than 40% from two years ago, symbolising the squeeze on ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, the national debt has surpassed 250 percent of GDP, leaving little room for the fiscal stimulus that Takaichi champions.
Her policy instincts remain rooted in Abenomics: loose monetary policy, targeted industrial investment, and grand promises of national revival. She has pledged to bolster Japan’s self-sufficiency in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and energy production. Without Komeito’s moderating influence, her fiscal agenda faces scepticism both inside and outside the LDP, where factions worry about debt sustainability and voter fatigue with unfulfilled economic slogans.
Demographics compound the challenge. Japan’s population is shrinking faster than expected, and nearly one-third of its citizens are now over 65, and social security spending already consumes a third of the national budget. Any meaningful economic reform must confront the question of how to sustain pensions and healthcare.
Internationally, Takaichi faces a fraught environment with few easy wins. Relations with Washington have grown tense under Donald Trump’s presidency. Tariffs on Japanese automobiles remain a looming threat to Japan’s export-driven economy. Takaichi’s close alignment with nationalist causes complicates her ability to manage an unpredictable White House and risks derailing the recent thaw in relations with Seoul.
Takaichi’s plan to revise Article 9 of the Constitution to permit more proactive military operations plays well with conservatives but has deepened divisions across the political spectrum. With Komeito’s exit, she loses the partner most capable of reassuring Japan’s pacifist-leaning public that defence expansion could coexist with constitutional restraint.
The collapse of the LDP-Komeito coalition leaves Takaichi facing an immediate political survival test. Without reliable parliamentary backing, even routine legislation could stall. Her ability to form a working alliance with Ishin or other minor parties will determine whether her government can function or becomes paralysed by gridlock.
The risks are high. Should she fail to stabilise her administration quickly, Japan could again slide into the revolving-door politics of the early 2010s, when prime ministers lasted barely a year. That instability would not only undercut domestic reform but also weaken Japan’s standing in an increasingly volatile Asia-Pacific region and open the door to hard-right parties gaining more seats in the legislature.
Takaichi’s rise was historic, but history alone would not sustain her in government. The tasks before her – rebuilding a broken coalition, reviving a stagnant economy, and redefining Japan’s role in a fractious world – would test even the most seasoned leader. Whether she can overcome the political isolation now closing in around her will determine not just the fate of her premiership, but the trajectory of Japanese conservatism in the post-Abe era.
AloJapan.com