Today marks the 80th anniversary of Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allies and the end of World War II. A leading Iranian news website published a straightforward account of how Japan set aside its national pride to save itself from further destruction.
The article avoided any reference to Iran’s own predicament under the looming threat of revived United Nations sanctions and possible new Israeli air strikes. But Iranians can hardly miss the analogy. Israel’s June air campaign crippled Iran’s military, the economy lies in ruins, and the regime lives under fear of revolt—conditions not unlike Japan’s in the summer of 1945.
Iran still insists on its right to enrich uranium, a demand Washington rejects.
Emperor Hirohito announced peace in his August 15 speech. By contrast, Iran’s aging Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—hidden from public view since June—has yet to decide whether to accept Western conditions. He has until the end of September, when Britain, France, and Germany, collectively known as the E3, will ask the United Nations Security Council to restore sanctions suspended under the 2015 nuclear deal.
Iran still insists on its right to enrich uranium, a demand Washington rejects. It also resists curbs on its ballistic missiles and regional interference. The question is whether Tehran will choose to “surrender” in September. It squandered a more honorable chance in 2021-22, when the Biden administration offered generous terms, but Tehran dragged its feet for over a year. President Donald Trump reversed course in February 2025, reinstating “maximum pressure,” a move that helped prompt Israel’s June airstrikes.
Even between February and June 2025, Khamenei had openings to change direction as talks with Washington took place. He stalled, assuming—as he had for two decades—that he could defer consequences. He miscalculated. This time the price was not just sanctions but bunker-busting bombs that demolished nuclear and military assets.
For years, analysts and millions of Iranians have asked: What drives Khamenei’s calculus? Why risk the country’s future by stoking regional conflicts and pursuing nuclear capability?
Western analysts offer several explanations. Some see ideological fanaticism at the core, tempered by a strategy of “strategic patience” to avoid direct war. “Khamenei is a true fanatic. He forged his beliefs as a revolutionary in the 1960s, when he read Sayyid Qutb and Mao Zedong,” Marxist Iranian analyst Arash Azizi wrote in The Atlantic.
Others have argued his overriding concern is projecting strength. In his view, compromise weakens the foundations of his rule. Many ordinary Iranians share this perspective, believing he isolates the country to perpetuate a Shi’ite kleptocracy. The question is which goal takes priority: unrelenting hostility toward the West or preservation of the authoritarian system he built.
For more than 20 years, Khamenei assumed the regime faced no imminent danger. He could simultaneously pursue Israel’s destruction and maintain his grip at home. Economic sanctions crushed growth and investment, but he treated them as temporary setbacks. He expected his proxy networks and the West’s reluctance to act would eventually hand him the advantage.
Khamenei [has] lost not only vital assets and leaders but also his sense of invulnerability.
That calculation collapsed in 2024, when Israel struck Hezbollah and Hamas, and in 2025, when Trump returned and Israel’s June campaign shattered Iran’s command structure and military infrastructure. Khamenei lost not only vital assets and leaders but also his sense of invulnerability.
Some Iranians now believe the West sees the game differently: either aiming for regime change or indifferent to whether the system survives. Yet uncertainty remains about Khamenei’s next step. As long as foreign troops stay out, an Iranian commented in a post on X, the regime may believe it can withstand sanctions and more airstrikes.
For now, officials signal they will continue the old playbook—negotiating to salvage whatever concessions they can. If they limit enrichment while yielding little else, they will claim victory. If the West stands firm, Khamenei faces far harder choices. In the narrow window left this month, a major shift seems unlikely. But if given more time, he almost certainly will revert to endless talks.
Will the West retreat and give Khamenei more time, or will he be forced to accept the unthinkable—just as Japan’s emperor did in August 1945?
AloJapan.com