The abolition of nuclear weapons remains one of humanity’s highest ideals. For Japan, as the only nation ever attacked with atomic bombs, continuing to champion that vision carries special weight. Yet, however strongly the call for abolition is voiced, the reality is moving in the opposite direction.
Since 2018, the number of deployable nuclear warheads has once again begun to climb and now totals 9,615 worldwide. In the past seven years alone, North Korea has added 35 warheads, bringing its arsenal to 50, while China has expanded by 360 to reach 600.
Nuclear Risk in a Taiwan Contingency
China’s rapid nuclear buildup may signal a shift in doctrine. Tong Zhao of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes that Beijing, long reluctant to move beyond its declared no-first-use posture, now appears to be preparing for a Launch-Under-Attack policy. This means it would launch a nuclear retaliation the moment it detects an enemy strike.
Former Ground Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff, Kiyofumi Iwata
At the same time, Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Vipin Narang and the NSC’s Pranay Vaddi warn that at least two among China, Russia, and North Korea could coordinate to neutralize America’s nuclear deterrent. Such a move would open the way for conventional military aggression. For the first time since World War II, they argue, Washington must grapple with the challenge of defending its allies against several nuclear-armed adversaries at once.
These risks become especially acute in the event of a Taiwan contingency. A 2022 war game conducted by NBC’s Meet the Press and the Center for a New American Security showed how quickly such a conflict could spiral toward nuclear use.
The United States Department of Defense echoed this concern in its December 2024 annual report. It warned that if China were to face defeat in a Taiwan operation and view the Communist Party’s survival as threatened, it might consider the first use of nuclear weapons.
The First Duty of Politics
With warnings that China could resort to nuclear weapons in a Taiwan contingency, potentially even against Japan, it is the duty of political leadership to safeguard national security. Yet both Japan’s politicians and its media continue to avert their eyes from this reality, avoiding even the most basic debate on nuclear deterrence.
On August 6, 2025, in Hiroshima, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba declared: “It is the mission of Japan, the only country to have suffered an atomic bomb attack, to lead international efforts toward a world without nuclear weapons.”
That commitment matters. But what Japan truly requires from its leader is a credible deterrent, a posture that will ensure nuclear weapons are never again used against Japan. Rallying public opinion behind that goal is not optional; it is the prime minister’s most fundamental responsibility.
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba at LDP headquarters, August 19 (©Sankei by Naka Haruna).
A Debate That Never Begins
On February 27, 2022, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe warned on television: “Our country lies under the US nuclear umbrella, but procedures for an emergency have never been discussed… We must debate how to defend our people and Japan’s independence, squarely facing reality.”
Yet barely a month later, the Liberal Democratic Party moved to shut down nuclear debate within its own National Defense Division.
Nor have other parties shown greater seriousness. In the July 2025 Upper House election, only a handful of candidates even mentioned nuclear deterrence in their manifestos or policy platforms. Can parties so unwilling to confront this issue truly call themselves responsible guardians of the people’s lives?
Reports indicate that in a 2024 tabletop exercise, simulating a Taiwan contingency, the Self-Defense Forces asked the US to counter China’s nuclear threats with nuclear threats of its own. Defense Minister Gen Nakatani has denied the account, but the question remains: isn’t that precisely the kind of request Japan should be making? Japan must never allow itself to bow to China’s nuclear intimidation.
Rethinking the Three Non-Nuclear Principles
In part to address Japanese concerns over deterrence, the Donald Trump administration advanced development of a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (SLCM-N), scheduled for deployment in the 2030s. Submarines or surface ships equipped with these so-called “nuclear Tomahawks” could, in a crisis, provide a vital shield against nuclear threats to Japan.
But when such vessels are deployed, Washington will inevitably seek permission for them to call at Japanese ports for resupply, maintenance, or crew rest.
Here, the “no introduction of” clause of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles becomes a serious obstacle. If Japan refuses port access, the United States would have every reason to question the credibility, even the value, of the alliance itself. At the very least, Japan must be prepared to openly debate this scenario, rather than sidestepping it.
Japan’s Political Duty
Japan’s leaders bear a dual responsibility. As the only nation to have suffered atomic bombings, they must continue to champion the ideal of abolition and insist that such a tragedy never be repeated anywhere in the world. On the other hand, they must confront the hard reality of mounting nuclear threats. That is, not shrinking from debate, but building a credible deterrent to ensure that Japan is never attacked again.
Eighty years after the atomic bombings, in August, that message could not be more urgent.
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Author: Kiyofumi Iwata
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